

# Two Concepts of Meditation and Three Kinds of Wisdom in Kamala Āla's A Problem of Translation

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ABSTRACT A close reading of the three

infrequently repetition. That being said, the three treatises cover an extraordinary range of subjects, all united around the central purpose of providing guidance to new practitioners of the teachings of the Mahāyāna.<sup>2</sup>

Historically, the Śālistambas' account of meditation has been enormously influential. Paul Williams has referred to the texts as 'the principal systematic Indian sources for the integration of emptiness teachings into Madhyamaka meditation practice' (Williams, 1989: 72). Elsewhere they have been described as 'the origin of Tibetan tradition of how to meditate' (Taniguchi, 1992: 303). This paper argues that there are, in fact, two competing concepts of meditation present in the texts. These two concepts are identifiable with two specific Sanskrit words, both of which have been commonly translated into English as 'meditation' – *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. Because Kamalāśīla does not employ these terms as synonyms, a problem arises for the modern day translator: which word, if either, should be privileged in translation as 'meditation'? While neither can carry the same range of meanings as the English word (on which, see below), in this paper it is argued that Kamalāśīla regarded *śamatha* as normative for the practice of beginners in the way of the Mahāyāna. So such, 'meditation' should be its default translation. For these texts, it is potentially misleading to translate *śamatha* as meditation. The issue is more than academic. Depending on the choice made, Kamalāśīla's account of the Mahāyāna Buddhist path to Awakening will be radically altered. To that extent, our understanding of both the doctrinal and practical foundations of Tibetan Buddhism will be affected.

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According to Edward Conze, 'The first explains the doctrine of the Mahāyāna, the second how it can be meditated upon, and the third what is the result of meditation' (1975: 177). Conze is here following a description contained in a Tibetan record cited in Tucci (1958: 40–41). The account has it that the Tibetan king, Khri Srong lde btsan, requested these explanations following Kamalāśīla's pivotal victory in debate over a Chinese rival of the Ch'an tradition (discussed below). The 'doctrine' of Bhk 1 is described as that of the three kinds of wisdom (*śamāntabuddhi*, *śūnyatā*, and *prajñā*). The way of meditation of Bhk 2 is explained in light of the realization that there is only one vehicle; it is the result of this meditation that Bhk 3 is said to explain. But such categorical statements are best made with caution; all three texts contain discussions of doctrine, meditation, and its result.

- Perhaps it is as much due to the excellence of scholarship already devoted to their study as it is to the breadth of their concern that the *śamatha* texts tend to be among the most widely quoted of Indian Buddhist texts. Tucci has provided critical editions of the Sanskrit and Tibetan of the Bhk 1 (1958) and the Sanskrit of the Bhk 3 (1971). Of the three texts, the original Sanskrit of the Bhk 2 is lost. As well, the first folio of the Sanskrit of Bhk 1 is missing, as are the edges of many of the pages of the manuscript of Bhk 3 from which Tucci worked. All three texts are, however, fully preserved in the Tibetan Tanjur. A critical edition of the Tibetan text of Bhk 2 based on the Narthang (N), Peking (P), Derge (D), and Cone (C) editions has been prepared by K. Goshima (1983). The Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies has published an edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, which occasionally serves to clarify Tucci (Namdol, 1997). This contains a Hindi translation and Sanskrit reconstructions of Bhk 2 and the first folio of Bhk 1. I have worked mainly

The three texts contain numerous instructions for the beginner in Mahāyāna meditation. Equally, the *śāstras* constitute a kind of apology or justification for a particular approach to the Buddhist path. The Tibetan tradition regards them as containing a summary of arguments employed in the refutation of a Chinese Ch'an position being advocated at the time of the first great transmission of Buddhism to Tibet. The debate has been characterized in terms of gradualism vs. subitism (Gomez, 1987). The gradualist view, associated with the Indian side led by Kamalāśīla, held that Awakening can only be attained after a long process of training in which one deliberately cultivates certain causes and conditions conducive to its occurrence. These causes and conditions are both moral and cognitive – one must cultivate specific moral virtues as well as a specific conceptual knowledge of the nature of reality. Such cultivation (*śikṣā*) is a gradual process – it takes time and has definite steps. The subitist position, represented by a Ch'an monk (*zhiyi*) named Mo ho yen (Sanskrit: Mahāyāna), held that Awakening occurs suddenly, all at once. Awakening was understood as a state requiring only the practice of a non-conceptual concentration or absorption (*śamatha*), wherein one's mind is cleared from all obscuring mental activity. Attempts to cultivate specific moral virtues and views of reality were understood as counterproductive on the grounds that they accumulate karma and prolong one's sojourn through cyclical existence.<sup>3</sup>

The contrary view, argued by Kamalāśīla, held that a particular kind of cognitive process – a 'correct analysis' or 'discernment of reality' (*śūnyatā*) – is essential to the achievement of Awakening. Because Awakening involves a kind of knowledge (i.e. non-conceptual knowledge, *prajñā*), and not merely concentration, it is essential to first become established not only in concentration but also in a correct conceptual knowledge which can then function to give rise to the sought after noetic state. The principle at work here is that like arises from like: one kind of knowledge arises on the basis of another. Kamalāśīla seems to have understood his opponent as arguing on the basis of the same causal principle, but focusing on the other aspect of Awakening – its non-conceptuality. Thus,

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3. Bhk 3 13.15–14.1:

/; D 61b1:

'But some consider, "Because they are subject to positive and negative actions generated by the conceptual mind, sentient beings spin around in cyclical existence experiencing the fruits of their actions, such as heaven. But those who do not think anything nor perform any action whatsoever, they are fully liberated from cyclical existence. Therefore nothing should be thought. Nor should the skillful conduct of giving and the rest be undertaken. The skillful conduct of giving and the rest is taught only with foolish people in mind".'

as a non-conceptual state of knowledge, Awakening might be thought of as only arising on the basis of non-conceptual concentration. According to Kamalaśīla, this is a misunderstanding; non-conceptual concentration, because it lacks a cognitive dimension, can not on its own result in a state of knowledge. At the same time, however, Kamalaśīla did recognize the concentrative nature of the resulting state of nonconceptual knowledge; he therefore accepted the necessity of initially combining the one-pointed quality of concentration with the noetic quality of conceptual knowledge. The resulting state could thus be both concentrated and noetic.<sup>4</sup>

To understand Kamalaśīla's views in more detail, I will attempt to demonstrate how he understood the logical relations obtaining between *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, as well as their relationships to other key terms denoting meditative states and processes. I will then attempt to demonstrate how it is that Kamalaśīla accepted as normative the concept of *śamatha*. But before entering into these topics it would perhaps be germane to say a few words about how I understand the English word 'meditation'.

In normal English usage, and in its most general conception, when one talks of 'meditation', in most cases one is referring to a deliberately undertaken introspective process which is aimed at reaching a qualitatively different state of mind – usually a spiritual state of some description (e.g. communion with God) or a heightened state of awareness. The process itself is marked by concentration – either upon some aspect of the goal sought or upon the activity itself. Such concentration usually follows a *śamatha* practice, which can be described and practised. Although introspective, this may involve a physical aspect. Practices of meditation vary widely, including everything from visualization, repetition of verbal phrases or prayers, to the walking of labyrinths. These diverse procedures share the features of voluntariness, introspection and concentration, and are all undertaken with the aim of bringing about an altered state of consciousness or a change in spiritual condition.

It is important to note, however, that in the western intellectual tradition there exists a second and related use of the word 'meditation' in which many of these features are not found. In this case the word meditation is employed to refer to processes of ordinary rational thought that are seriously undertaken and concerned with topics judged to be important or profound. 'Meditation' in this sense is a kind of intellectual contemplation or rumination, involving neither a special technique of concentration nor the idea of achieving of an altered state of consciousness. This employment of the word is perhaps most famously exemplified

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4. Thus the two opponents both asserted that an initial practice of concentration was necessary, but they disagreed as to its nature. Just as from Kamalaśīla's perspective, Mo ho yen's difficulty was to explain the noetic aspect of Awakening on the basis of a non-cognitive practice; from Mo ho yen's perspective, Kamalaśīla's difficulty would be to explain Awakening's nonconceptuality arising on the basis of a conceptual process. In addition, as noted, Mo ho yen held that such conceptual activities were karmatic and thus counterproductive with respect to liberation.



The second point is that Kamalaśīla subdivides the first absorption into two.<sup>6</sup> The first division contains both *śūnyatā* and *prajñā*, the second contains *śūnyatā* but not *prajñā*. This second division he calls 'intermediate absorption' (*madhyamābhyaṅga*).<sup>7</sup> We shall see that Kamalaśīla may actually have accepted the possibility of a deliberate conceptual analysis of reality occurring in the first *śūnyatā*; if so, it might



in the Buddhist tradition is generally understood to be divisible into the two subcategories of tranquillity ( ) and insight ( ). Kamalaśīla accepts this division.<sup>10</sup> The term (Pāli ) is derived from the verbal root (to be quiet, to cease, to rest).<sup>11</sup> The principal significations of are those of calmness and the capacity to remain continuously focused on one object of meditation. Thus the cultivation of tranquillity brings about states of concentration and calm, such as the . With respect to Awakening, the function of is to stabilize the mind, thereby making possible.

: this term is the Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit word corresponding to the Pāli . It is derived from the verbal root 'to see', plus the prefix which can have the senses of 'apart, asunder' and 'different, distinct'. The resulting sense is one of 'seeing into' or 'discerning'. Hence 'insight' is the usual translation for this term. In general, is understood to refer to observational and analytic processes that lead to a knowledge of reality.

In the s, is specifically identified with a technical term, namely, 'the discernment of reality' ( ). As Kamalaśīla quotes from the s, 'Tranquillity is one-pointedness of mind; insight is the discernment of reality'.<sup>12</sup>

The function of is to perceive the elements of reality ( s) as they truly are. If the effect of is to enable it is that allows for non-conceptual knowledge to occur. And on this basis Awakening is gradually achieved.

By the power of tranquillity the mind becomes steady on its object, like a lamp [burning] in a place without wind. By insight, the light of correct

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one might note that the process of making such efforts would involve concentrating ( ) on the desired state. In addition, when specific states of concentration (such as those of ) are aimed at, this might be thought of as a case of the first right effort, that which is aimed at the arising of non-arisen pure s. This, however, was apparently a point of controversy between different Buddhist schools. The Vaibhīkikas apparently considered a separate mental while the Sautrāntikas thought it simply referred to a concentrated mind ( 1126.6-1127.3).

10. Bhk 2 D46b1-2:

//: 'The yogin, forsaking  
meat and fish at all times of meditation , should eat only the proper amount  
of food and that which is not incompatible (with the scriptures). In this manner, s  
who have accumulated all the conditions of tranquillity and insight  
should enter into meditation'.

11. Plus the ' . See Pālini 3.3.92. Thanks to Sanjay Kumar Shastri of McGill University for clarifying the derivations of and

12. Bhk 33.1-4:

/; D 56b3-4:

//: 'Thus in the noble and  
elsewhere the Bhagavān concisely stated the definition of tranquillity and insight, "Tranquillity  
is one-pointedness of mind, insight is the discernment of reality"'. Also quoted at Bhk 2 D 47a2.



knowledge emerges on the basis of accurately realizing the true nature of things. And on that basis all obscurity is removed, just as the night is dispelled by the dawning of the sun.<sup>13</sup>

The difference between tranquillity and insight can also be understood in terms of the application of concepts to the object of the meditation. Adhering to the *śūnyavāda*, Kamalaśīla asserts that *śūnyavāda* is nonconceptual and that *śūnyavāda* is conceptual.

[T]he *śūnyavāda* taught four realities as meditation objects for yogis: a) a reflection without conceptualization b) a reflection accompanied by conceptualization c) the limit of things and d) the perfection of purpose. In this context, when by means of tranquillity one has committed oneself to a reflection of all things or to a form like that of the Buddha, that which is depended upon is called a reflection without conceptualization. It is called without conceptualization here because of an absence of concepts determining the real object-meaning. And it is called a reflection because it is depended upon, having committed oneself to a reflection of

Thus, according to Kamalaśīla, in [ ] concepts ( [ ] ) are deliberately applied when one analyses ( [ ] ) the meditation object. Kamalaśīla's use of the verbal form, [ ] can be taken to indicate the fact that he considered a kind of subtle thought ( [ ] ) to be present in [ ]. If this is so, it raises the question as to Kamalaśīla's views regarding the compatibility of [ ] and [ ] .

and is as follows: any instance of implies and any instance of implies if and only if . In effect, what this means is that we cannot conceive one without also implying the other. (It does not mean that every proposition that is true of the one is true of the other).

Given this understanding, we may now return to the question of Kamala la's understanding of the relationship between . We can approach this topic initially by asking how our author may have regarded the relationship between and . While Kamala la nowhere comments directly on this issue, given the analysis just made, can be seen as a kind of 'bridge term' linking his conceptions of and . By recalling the relationship between and discussed earlier a logical structure begins to emerge. The four s it will be remembered, are all specific forms of meditative concentration ( ). Thus any instance of is also an instance of (If then ). The reverse, however, is not the case; we have seen that is the wider term, encompassing some forms of concentration not included in the four s. From this it follows that while implies (If then ), the reverse (If Bh then Dh) is not the case. There are some instances of where is not involved.

With these considerations in mind, we can view our question concerning the interrelationship of meditation terms in the s as a kind of dilemma of translation. If, on the one hand, we translate as meditation, then this would open the door to the logical possibility that some forms of would not be properly conceived of as meditation for these texts. This would be consistent with a view of as 'cultivation' in the wider, non-technical sense mentioned above. Some instances of would not have been considered by Kamala la as involving that concentration or one-pointedness of mind which, in the Buddhist tradition, is the hallmark of meditative states of consciousness. In particular, this way of understanding the texts opens up the possibility that the component of might have been conceived as a kind of complimentary intellectual process of logical reasoning ( ) that is not fundamentally meditative in nature. might not have been understood as a form of meditative concentration in the technical sense of one pointedness of mind. According to this way of thinking, the term 'meditation' would be restricted to states of (including the s in which there is no deliberate discursive activity.<sup>17</sup>

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cultivate) that is employed when the actual procedure for meditating is being described. There are no instances of a conjugation of √ in these texts. In the Tibetan, as well, it is the verb (equivalent to ) that is employed in these contexts.

17. This way of reading the s would emphasize the continuity of Kamala la's thought with that of the Buddhist epistemological tradition going back to Dign ga. Hayes (1988: 168) and Prévèreau (1994: 33) have both suggested that is identified as a kind of meditation by Dign ga (c. 480–540). According to Prévèreau, 'Ya omitra suggests that is synonymous with (AKIV:14) so that there is not only the insight brought

This understanding, however, raises a problem. If \_\_\_\_\_, as a process of conceptual analysis, is not understood as meditative in nature, this would appear to be at odds with Kamalaśīla's acceptance of the subdivision of \_\_\_\_\_ into non-conceptual \_\_\_\_\_ and conceptual \_\_\_\_\_. We would be forced to conclude that Kamalaśīla's account is inconsistent.

If, on the other hand, \_\_\_\_\_ is translated as 'meditation', then the process of \_\_\_\_\_ will necessarily be understood as meditative in nature. However, the nature of \_\_\_\_\_ as a mental process that is at once concentrative and analytic will be problematic. How can the mind remain focused on one point and engage in conceptual analysis at the same time? On this understanding, Kamalaśīla's account would appear to be unintelligible.

So how do we decide? In order to address this issue, I will discuss Kamalaśīla's ideas in light of a fundamental conceptual paradigm upon which the



meaning. For the Madhyamaka tradition, the distinction is cashed out in terms of their reference: definitive statements are those that pertain to ultimate truth (i.e. variously etc.), provisional statements refer to the conventional (Thurman, 1978: 26, 32–4). According to Kamalaśīla's account, it is the task of the wisdom of thinking to identify which statements refer to the real object or meaning ( ) and which do not. The task of the wisdom of is to the meaning or object that is real.

There, first of all, the wisdom of study should be generated. For through it one initially enters into the meaning of the scriptures. Thereafter one penetrates their provisional and definitive meanings by the wisdom of thinking. After that, having ascertained the meaning that is real

). It is an experiential process of discerning reality, one that occurs in a concentrated state ( ).

In the Buddhist context, direct experience possesses an epistemologically

We can see that the question of the best Sanskrit equivalent for 'meditation' in the *śūtras* is not unrelated to the debate between Kamalaśīla and Mo ho yen. It is perhaps not without reason that these three texts were so repetitively entitled 'The Process of *śamāpatti*'. *śamāpatti* is a term for processes that include the development of wisdom through concentrated conceptual activity. In the *śūtras*, Kamalaśīla portrays his opponent as adhering to a conception of *śamāpatti* that excludes deliberate conceptual activity. Kamalaśīla's charge against his Ch'an rival consisted precisely in the claim that he failed to understand the necessity of conceptual activity in the achievement of Awakening. As an advocate of *śamāpatti*, Mo ho yen was viewed as interpreting Awakening as an accomplishment achieved simply by ceasing all mental activity.<sup>25</sup> But according to Kamalaśīla, it is only through the particular conceptual activity that is the discernment of reality (*prajñā*) that nonconceptual knowledge or gnosis (*prajñā*) can arise.<sup>26</sup>

While Kamalaśīla's criticisms of Mo ho yen are centred upon the idea of knowledge (*prajñā*), Mo ho yen's critique of Kamalaśīla can be viewed as focusing on the idea of action (*śamāpatti*). It is the deliberate, volitional nature of the conceptual activities enjoined by Kamalaśīla that he objects to. Volitional activity is precisely that which binds sentient beings to the wheel of rebirth. As such, it is counterproductive. This would seem to be the crux of the disagreement. For Kamalaśīla, some actions are necessary to the achievement of Awakening.

If, then, *śamāpatti* is to be considered the broader term for meditation in these texts, and if *prajñā* is a kind of *śamāpatti* that is necessary for Awakening, we

25. This doctrine is ascribed to the *śūtras*. Bhk 3 20.14–16:

: D 64b1

4:

//: 'Now as for what is also said

– that not a single action, skillful or otherwise, should be performed – those who speak thus would here be accepting the doctrine of the *śūtras*, that is, liberation on the basis of karma's destruction'.

26. When the practitioner reaches the point of comprehending emptiness nonconceptually, this constitutes 'the limit of things' mentioned above (Bhk 3 2.8–10; D 56a7–b1) and the arising of the first stage and transcendent path of the *śūtras*. On this basis, gradually but inevitably the *śūtras*'s purpose is perfected and the omniscience of Buddhahood is achieved. Quoting from the *śūtras*, the ultimate justification for the practice of insight is dramatically explained. Bhk 2 D 49b5–b6:

(NP ) (NP omit ) (Goshima follows NP: )

//: 'Someone who only cultivates the mere abandonment of mental activity, but who does not meditate having analysed the nature of entities with wisdom, will never get rid of concepts and will not come to realize the absence of inherent nature – on account of the absence of the light of wisdom. So it is said by the Illustrious One, "When the fire of knowing reality as such arises from the very discernment of reality, it incinerates the wood of concepts, just as the fire of firesticks rubbed together [consumes the sticks themselves]". See also Bhk 3 30.8–11.



may well ask what precisely its undertaking was thought to involve. Here I can only give a brief indication of Kamala la's conception, in relation to other meditation terminology already discussed.

First of all, the process is described as being undertaken while actually abiding in a state of . '[H]aving renounced all obscurations, one who wants pure knowledge to arise must cultivate wisdom while abiding in tranquillity'.<sup>27</sup>

Similar considerations apply to . Quoting from the

... [H]aving abandoned mental distractions, he inwardly discerns those very same previously considered s as reflections in the sphere of concentration (T. Skt. ). In this manner, discriminating the meaning of what is to be known in those reflections in the sphere of concentration, thoroughly discriminating, completely considering, completely investigating, forbearing, accepting, classifying, looking and knowing – is called insight. So it is that the bodhisattva is skilled in insight.<sup>28</sup>

Thus while Kamala la's views regarding the compatibility of with both and are clear, the question still remains as to whether he regarded its conjunction with as possible. In the s the two terms are never mentioned in the same breath. In spite of this fact, my suggestion is that Kamala la did regard them as compatible and that, given the presence of thought ( ) within the first , it is precisely this meditative state that theoretically allows the two to come together. Indeed, among the s, this conjunction would have been considered possible in the first since thought is absent from the second to the fourth s. In particular, it may well have been the higher, intermediate division of the first absorption ( ) that Kamala la associated with the possibility of the practice of insight meditation. It will be recalled that it is in this division that gross thought ( ) is absent while subtle thought remains. If we associate the activity of subtle thought with the verbal form employed by Kamala la in

27. Bhk 2 D 44b7–45a1:

// . While basic, such a notion has been taken by some scholars as suggesting a conceptual tension in Buddhist meditation theory. How can conceptual analysis occur in a state of one-pointed meditation? According to Gri ths, it led to various attempts to regard insight as occurring in 'liminal states' between the s. This difficulty may well provide some explanation for the postulation of an intermediate (1983: 245–51, 285–7; also see Vetter, 1988: xxv–xxvii).

28. Bhk 2 D 47a –47b :

// . (See Powers, 1995: 150–52, 341–2).

describing the practice of insight according to the \_\_\_\_\_, the connection would be made.<sup>29</sup>

The other possibility, as discussed, is that insight be understood in terms of

29. Indeed this would seem to be confirmed by Kamala la's employment of the same verb in describing the experiential process of conceptual analysis outlined in the \_\_\_\_\_ . In editing the Sanskrit text of Bhk 1, Tucci created a separate section for this description, No. 16, which he entitled 'Method of meditation according to the \_\_\_\_\_ ; vic ra on the dharmas (no object, no subject), etc'. This section occurs immediately following Kamala la's discussion of \_\_\_\_\_ ; both are set in the overall context of \_\_\_\_\_ . Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal extensively with Kamala la's account of the \_\_\_\_\_ , a brief excerpt should suffice to demonstrate the experiential quality of the language he employs. After having stabilized the mind on the five aggregates as a meditation object (Bhk 1 206.7-15), the analytic process is described as commencing with an analysis of \_\_\_\_\_ s with material form: Bhk 1 210.16-211.4:

/; D 33a4-34b1:

\_\_\_\_\_ /: 'First of all the yogin should analyse ( \_\_\_\_\_ those \_\_\_\_\_ s having a material form, imagined by others as being external objects: "Are these other than consciousness, or is it this consciousness itself appearing in that manner – just as in dreamstate?" In that regard [i.e. if the position held is that they have a nature] outside of consciousness, he should break them down into atoms ( \_\_\_\_\_ T. \_\_\_\_\_ . And discerning ( \_\_\_\_\_ T. \_\_\_\_\_ those atoms by way of parts, the yogin does not see \_\_\_\_\_ T. \_\_\_\_\_ those things. Not seeing (them), he thinks: "All this is indeed mind-only, an external object does not exist". Therefore thus: "Having ascended to mind-only, one would not imagine an external object". The meaning is that he would abandon conceptualizations of \_\_\_\_\_ s that have a material form. He should draw a conclusion \_\_\_\_\_ T. \_\_\_\_\_ from the non-apprehension of those things that are in principle apprehensible. Thus having broken down \_\_\_\_\_ T. \_\_\_\_\_ s with a material form, he should break down \_\_\_\_\_ T. \_\_\_\_\_ those without material form'.

It is apparent that here the conceptual analysis or 'breaking down' of experienced realities is considered part of the process of insight. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to consider the inferences comprising this analysis as instances of \_\_\_\_\_ . Because they are undertaken while in the sphere of \_\_\_\_\_ , they are properly considered as meditative in nature; they form part of what is meant by \_\_\_\_\_ . They appear to be distinct from cases of ordinary inference insofar as they seem to be conceived as directly 'based upon' objects and objective states of a

non-experiential processes of ordinary reasoning ( ); this opens the door to two possible ways of translating. The first would take as the default term for meditation, exclusively referring to states in which there is no deliberate discursive activity. would be understood as a complimentary intellectual process that is not meditative in nature. But the problem with this suggestion is that it does not recognize Kamala la's acceptance of as a subdivision of , as discussed above. A second, more sophisticated possibility would treat both nonconceptual and rational as kinds of meditation – albeit forms which are distinct and mutually exclusive in their natures. As rational insight, would count as a kind of meditation much in the same way as do Descartes' reflections for the western intellectual tradition. On this account, the process of meditation would have to consist of a serial alternation, back and forth, between the modes of ordinary rational thought and wholly non-conceptual concentration.<sup>30</sup> While coherent, the problem with this account is that it fails to take seriously the Indian division of wisdom into three kinds and the clear connection between and . Furthermore, and perhaps more tellingly, it does not accurately reflect Kamala la's own descriptions of the process of insight. A careful reading of the texts shows that Kamala la's use of *Wahingyirja* (two) (more precisely, it is a kind of the *ispice*) (Bp. 11) (BTJ T

seems clear that Kamalaśīla is not describing a case of ordinary logical reasoning, but rather a subtle form of *śūnyatā* analysis. It is an intentionally undertaken practice that occurs in a heightened state of one-pointed consciousness, a practice that is at once conceptual analysis and meditation.

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### ABBREVIATIONS

Abhk

Swami Dharmapala (ed.) (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1987).

B. U.

Bhk

- Gomez, Louis O., 1987. 'Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and Intuition in Buddhist Thought and Practice'. In *Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Path of Tibetan Buddhism*, Peter N. Gregory (ed.), pp. 67–165. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
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